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1 Introduction
Banks routinely face mismatches between the timing of receipts and payments in a day.
To smooth out the ow of payments between banks, central banks often provide intra-
day credit to banks.1 They also o¤er overnight liquidity to banks who end a day with
inadequate reserves to cover their payments. A key puzzle in the economics of payments
is the large di¤erence between the cost of intraday and overnight liquidity. Typically, the
cost of intraday liquidity is very close to zero while the interest rate charged on overnight
liquidity is in the 3-6% range. In this paper, we provide one possible argument for why such
a cost-spread may be part of an optimal money and payments system design. Indeed, we
argue that intraday (within a period) liquidity should come at a low cost because it has a low
social opportunity cost, an idea originally due to Friedman (1969). In contrast, overnight
(across periods) liquidity should be expensive because its overuse causes a reduction in
output.
We study a random-relocation economy similar to Champ, Smith, and Williamson
(1996) but augmented to include features from Freeman (1996) and Mills (2004, forthcom-
ing). The setting is a two-period lived overlapping generations model where limited com-
munication and random relocation create an endogenous transactions role for at money.2
Agents are ex ante identical. Before the end of their rst period of life, a fraction of agents
receives a liquidity shock. Agents who receive the shock are relocated (henceforth early
movers) and the only asset they can carry with them is money. Agents who are not
relocated when young may possibly be relocated at the beginning of their second period
of life (henceforth late movers). Agents can exert costly e¤ort to reduce the probabil-
ity of being an early mover but the fraction of late movers is exogenously given. Money
competes as an asset with a linear storage technology that transforms period t goods into
1See Ennis and Weinberg (2007) for a survey of the issues.
2Economies with spatial separation and limited communication were rst studied by Townsend (1980,
1987).
2
period t + 1 goods. The return on storage is negatively a¤ected by the fraction of early
movers. In contrast, the fraction of late movers does not a¤ect the return on storage. This
is the key distinction between intraday and overnight liquidity. It captures the idea that
intraday liquidity is used mainly for settlement while central banks often use the overnight
rate to steer the economy.
In this environment a planner would like to distort the consumption of early movers
but not of late movers (who are similar to non-movers from the perspective of the planner).
The planner wants to provide incentives for young agents to exert e¤ort so as to reduce the
fraction of early movers thereby improving the return to storage and hence output. It is
possible to decentralize the planners allocation by setting a high cost of liquidity for early
movers and no cost of liquidity for late movers.
The main insight is that the cost of liquidity should be related to its role in payments
or as a substitute for other assets that contribute to output. If liquidity is used only to
make payments, then it should have a very low cost so as to share risk between ex-ante
identical agents. If liquidity can be used as a substitute for other assets, then it should
have a high cost to reduce the incentive to overuse it.
The payments literature has provided several explanations for the low cost of intraday
liquidity. Angelini (1998), and Bech and Garratt (2003) argue that a high cost of intraday
liquidity can lead to costly delay of payments. Zhou (2000) and Martin (2004) argue that
a low cost of liquidity provides risk-sharing when payments needs are random. In all of
these models, the focus is on the cost of intraday liquidity rather than on the relationship
between intraday and overnight liquidity.
In contrast to these earlier papers, we consider an environment in which costly overnight
liquidity is necessary to obtain the planners allocation. In such an environment, the
fact that intraday liquidity should have a low cost naturally arises as an application of
the Friedman rule; simply put, at a zero rate the social cost of using money is equal to
the opportunity cost of holding money. For this reason, our paper is also related to the
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literature concerned with the optimality of the Friedman rule.3 In our model, deviating
from the Friedman rule is desirable because money is overused if it is too good an asset.
Specically, excessive use of money (too many movers) reduces output. 4
To highlight the role of the di¤erent elements of our model, we introduce them one at
a time. Section 2 describes the basic features of the physical environment. In section 3 we
assume that the e¤ort exerted by agents observable. In this case, the planner does not need
to distort consumption to achieve the desired level of e¤ort. The planners allocation can
be decentralized with a low cost for overnight liquidity. Section 4 considers the case where
e¤ort is unobservable. With hidden e¤ort, the planner chooses to distort consumption to
provide incentives for agents to exert e¤ort. The planners allocation can be decentralized
if the cost of overnight liquidity is high. Finally, in section 5 we introduce intraday liquidity
in the model and show that its cost should be zero.
2 The environment
We consider a random relocation model in the style of Townsend (1987) augmented to
include an e¤ort decision. There is an innite sequence of time periods. Dates are indexed
by t = :::   1; 0; 1; :::.5 The world is divided into two spatially separated locations. Each
location is populated by a continuum of overlapping generations of agents of unit mass.
Agents live for two periods. There is a single, perishable consumption good.
The economys key friction is a physical restriction preventing the consumption good
from moving between the two locations. We further assume that claims on one islands
consumption good are not transferable to the other island. In contrast, some agents may
3See Bhattacharya, Haslag, and Martin (2005) and the references therein.
4Our paper is also related to recent attempts to study optimal monetary policy in environments with
hidden e¤ort such as da Costa and Werning (2003) and Golosov, Kocherlakota, and Tsyvinski (2003).
5 It is standard in this literature to have an initial period and an initial old generation but to ignore the
welfare of that initial generation. To simplify the exposition we choose instead to have no initial period.
Bhattacharya, Haslag, and Martin (2006) contrast economies with or without an initial date.
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have to move between islands. Young agents are all identical ex ante but face uncertainty
regarding where they will spend their old age. Let i denote the probability that the ith
young agent will be relocated to the other island. We denote by  the aggregate fraction
of young agents who are relocated. Since all agents i are ex ante identical, we can write
i =  8i, provided all agents exert the same amount of e¤ort. Under certain regularity
conditions, the law of large numbers applies and the measure of agents relocated will be
equal to the probability that one agent will be relocated; that is,  = : The identity
of those who are relocated is revealed before the end of the period. The two islands are
symmetric so that the ow of relocated agents to and from an island o¤set each other,
leaving the population unchanged. We refer to relocated agents as movers and the others
as non-movers.
2.1 Endowments and technology
At each date a young agent is endowed with ! units of the single consumption good.
In addition, each young agent is endowed with one unit of time. Old agents receive no
endowment. The young agent can divide their time between leisure and e¤ort, denoted by
lt and et, respectively, and lt + et = 1.
E¤ort by agent i a¤ects the probability that a person will be relocated; we posit the
function i (e) satises 0i < 0, 
00
i > 0, i(0) =  < 1, and i(1) =   0. Also,
limei!0 0i =  1 and limei!1 0i = 0. Hence, as e¤ort by the ith agent approaches zero,
the marginal e¤ect on the probability of being relocated is greatest. As e¤ort approaches
its maximum level, the e¤ect on that probability vanishes.
There is a storage technology on each island transforming date t goods into date t +
1 goods. We assume that the storage technology requires monitoring by young agents.
Monitoring is costless but needs to occurs later than the time at which early movers are
relocated. Hence, the return on storage is negatively related to the fraction of movers. If no
one moves, the storage technology yields a xed real gross return of x > 1: More generally
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though, we assume this return is given by x [1 (1  )] > 1 where  is the fraction of x
lost because some agents had to move. The return of each individual project thus depends
on the fraction of movers on the island. The higher the mass of movers, the lower is the
islands average return.6
It is important to note that any individual agent behaves as if he can inuence (via
e¤ort) his own probability of relocation but not the return to the storage technology (which
depends on the aggregate value ): So, the representative agents takes  as given, ignoring
the impact that the agent, who is atomistic, has on the social return.
As an alternative to the standard relocation shock assumption, we could have assumed
that agents are subject to enforcement shocks which force them to use cash. See Kahn
and Roberds (forthcoming) for an environment in which the use of cash is motivated by
enforcement shocks.
2.2 Preferences
Agents derive utility from old-age consumption and from enjoying leisure when young. Util-
ity is additively separable in consumption and leisure. Let ct denote old-age consumption
enjoyed by members of the generation born at date t; utility derived from the consump-
tion good is represented by the function U(ct). We assume that U(:) is twice continuously
di¤erentiable and strictly concave; formally, U 0 > 0 and U 00 < 0. Let V (1  et) character-
ize the function mapping leisure into utility, where we apply the constraint on time with
lt = 1   et. We assume V (:) is increasing and strictly concave. In other words V 0  0,
V 00 < 0, liml!0 V 0 =1, and liml!1 V 0 = 0.
6A potentially useful parable is that the endowment is in units of apples. Let the storage technology be
interpreted as the apple trees. So a young agent can take apple seeds to turn into apples next period as
the mature tree yields fruit when old. The social return owes to each agent maintaining bees to pollinate
the trees. Movers cannot maintain their beehives. Consequently, a measure of beehives fail to pollinate the
islands trees, lowering the aggregate return per tree. In this way, the return per unit of the consumption
good has a social aspect. We simply assume that the islands trees are identical for a given measure of
functioning beehives.
6
The time line is as follows: An agent is born, receiving an endowment. Next, the storage
and e¤ort decisions must be made followed by the relocation announcement. Movers are
permitted to create claims on the deeds to their storage and are relocated. The period
ends. In the following period, agents who are now old consume.
3 An economy with observable e¤ort
As a benchmark we study the case where e¤ort is observable. We show that in this case the
planner wants to equalize consumption between movers and non-movers. Then we show
how the planners allocation can be decentralized.
3.1 The planning problem
We derive the allocation chosen by a planner who can observe the e¤ort exerted by agents.
Since all generations are identical, the planner seeks to maximize the expected utility of a
young agent in a representative generation.
Since goods cannot move between islands, the planner must distribute the goods avail-
able on an island to the agents present. At the planners disposal are the goods stored on
behalf of the date t generation, denoted by st, and the goods available from the date t+ 1
generations endowment. We focus on stationary allocations so the amount of goods of the
date t+ 1 generations endowment that is stored, st+1, must be equal to st.
The planner takes into account the fact that agentse¤orts a¤ect the probability with
which they are relocated and, indirectly, the return on investment. Since e¤ort is observ-
able, the planner can punish agents who do not exert the desired amount of e¤ort. We
assume that the punishment can be severe enough so that no agent will unilaterally deviate
from the e¤ort prescribed by the planner.
The planners problem is given by
max
cmt ;c
n
t ;et;st
(e)U(cmt ) + [1 (e)]U(cnt ) + V (1  et); (1)
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subject to
(et)c
m
t + [1 (et)]cnt = x [1 (et)(1  )] st + !t+1   st+1; (2)
st  !t; (3)
where cmt denotes the quantity of the consumption good allocated to movers, c
n
t denotes
the quantity of the consumption good allocated to non-movers. We let t and t denote
the Lagrange multipliers associated with the rst and second constraints, respectively.
The rst-order conditions for the planners problem are given by
(et)U
0(cmt )  t(et) = 0; (4)
[1 (et)]U 0(cnt )  t [1 (et)] = 0; (5)
0(et) [U(cmt )  U(cnt )]  V 0(1  et)  t

0(et) [x(1  )st   cmt + cnt ]
	
= 0; (6)
t [x(1 (et)(1  )]  t   t+1 = 0: (7)
All constraints hold with equality because the planner chooses positive levels of con-
sumption, e¤ort, and storage. In a stationary allocation, since st+1 = st and x [1 (et)(1  )] >
1, the planner wants to store as many goods as possible. It follows that st+1 = st = !t. In
e¤ect, the planner stores all the endowment goods of the young, and distributes the stored
goods from the previous generation between old movers and old non-movers on the island.
Equations (4) and (5) imply that U 0(cmt ) = t = U 0(cnt ): This implies cmt = cnt = ct:
In other words, the planner provides the same amount of consumption to movers and
non-movers and the risk of relocation is shared perfectly.
With cmt = c
n
t = ct and st = !, equation (6) simplies to
V 0(1  et) =  U 0 (x [1 (et)(1  )]!)0(et)[x(1  )!]: (8)
The LHS of equation (8) is positive and increases from 0 to innity as e¤ort goes from
0 to 1. Since 0 < 0, the RHS of equation (8) is positive. Hence there will be an interior
solution for the e¤ort level. A su¢ cient condition for the e¤ort level to be unique is that
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the RHS of equation (8) be decreasing. The planner trades o¤ between the marginal cost
of the e¤ort to the individual agent versus the marginal benet in terms of additional
resources available to the society.
Let fcm; cn; e; sg denote the planners allocation. We can summarize these results
in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 The planner stores all available goods, s = !, and gives the same con-
sumption to movers and non-movers, cm = cn. The planners choice of e¤ort, e, is
determined by equation (8).
3.2 Decentralizing the planning solution
In this section, we study one possible way in which the planners allocation can be decen-
tralized. We assume the existence of a public sector, a joint government and central bank,
which we call the CB. The CB can issue at money at no cost and can choose prices at
which it buys and sells goods using that money. We associate the liquidity provided by
the CB in this case with overnight liquidity. The CB redistributes any prots it makes in a
lump-sum fashion. Since e¤ort is observable, we also assume that the CB can punish agents
who do not choose the level of e¤ort consistent with the planners allocation. The CB is
also subject to the physical restriction that prevents goods from moving across islands even
as cash remains transportable across the two islands.
The timing goes as follows: First, young agents receive their endowment and invest it
in the storage technology. They must also decide how much e¤ort to exert. After the e¤ort
decision is made, agents learn whether they must relocate. The CB opens and agents can
exchange at money for the claims on stored goods they hold. Recall that claims cannot
be accepted on the other island. Then movers relocate. In their second period of life,
nonmovers consume the goods to which they have a claim. Movers buy goods from the CB
with the money they hold.
Note that the CB does not need to keep track of agents from one island to another.
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While the CB operates on both islands, the branch on one island does not need to know
whom the branch on the other island has traded with. Also, in contrast to the standard
random relocation model, there is no need for banks in this economy. It is enough for the
central bank to buy and sell goods, as we show below.7
Let mt denote the amount of money given to agents in exchange for qt goods. Let vt
denote the units of goods per unit of money (the inverse of the price level). It follows
that qt = vt mt where mt and vt are both choice variables of the CB. We assume that the
CB buys and sells goods at the same price. Formally, at each date, the CB in any island
receives goods from young movers leaving that island worth vt mt. The CB also repays
goods to old movers (those who have moved from the other island) worth vt mt 1. The
di¤erence, denoted by Tt is distributed in lump-sum fashion to young agents:
vt mt   vt mt 1 = Tt: (9)
Each unit of good held by the CB at date t  1 turns into x [1 (1  )] units of goods
at date t.
An equilibrium in this economy is a choice of consumption, e¤ort, and storage that
maximizes the agents problem, described below, taking the policy of the CB as given. The
objective of the CB is to maximize agentsexpected utility.
Young non-movers cannot consume any more by obtaining cash from the CB. For this
reason, we assume that non-movers do not exchange claims for money at the CB even if
they are indi¤erent between doing so or not. Young movers cannot do worse than getting
money from the CB since they would consume nothing in the absence of the cash.8
All agents choose e¤ort ei = e since the CB can punish agents who do not choose
the level or e¤ort consistent with the planners allocation. Let   (e); also note
7See Schreft and Smith (1997) for an exposition of a standard random relocation model. See Haslag and
Martin (forthcoming) for more details on the role of the central bank in providing liquidity.
8One interpretation for this arrangement is that the CB makes discount window loans to agents, as in
Antinol and Keister (2006) or Haslag and Martin (forthcoming). However, our arrangement requires less
information as the CB does not need to keep track of moving agents, as noted above.
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that i (ei) = (e): The representative young person born at date t solves the following
problem:
max
cmt ;c
n
t ;st
U(cmt ) + (1 )U(cnt ) + V (1  et ); (10)
subject to
st  ! + Tt; (11)
cnt  x [1 (1  )] st; (12)
vt mt  st; (13)
cmt  vt+1 mt: (14)
First note that any agent takes the aggregate probability of relocation as given and not
something they can inuence. Equation (11) states that agents cannot store more than their
endowment and the transfer from the CB. Equation (12) indicates that the consumption
of non-movers cannot exceed the return on their storage. Equation (13) tells us that the
real money balances received from the CB cannot exceed the goods that are o¤ered in
exchange. Finally, equation (14) states that the consumption of movers is bounded by the
amount of goods obtained in exchange for money from the CB.
Proposition 2 An equilibrium with perfect risk sharingthat is, cm = cncan be imple-
mented by the CB setting the return to money equal to the return to storage.
Proof. If the money supply is held constant, T must be equal to zero. Since consumption
increases in st, agents choose st = !. Consumption of movers and non-movers will thus be
equal if and only if
vt+1
vt
= x [1 (1  )] :
This means that the return on money between periods is equal to the return on storage.
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In other words, this is the Friedman rule. By implementing the Friedman rule, the CB
is able to obtain the e¢ cient allocation. In this economy, vt is a policy variable and not a
market determined price level. This is because money does not circulate between agents.
We thus have a model of intermediated moneysince money only circulates between the
CB and the agents. In particular, the gross steady-state return on money is not equal to
one. Martin and Haslag (forthcoming) show in a related framework, that this economy is
the limiting case of an economy in which the money circulate between agents and in which
the CB implements the Friedman rule.
Thus far, we have shown that when e¤ort choice is observable and enforceable, a cen-
tral bank can replicate the rst best by implementing the Friedman rule (setting a zero
opportunity cost for overnight liquidity). To foreshadow, below we show that when e¤ort
choice is unobservable, deviating from the Friedman rule will be called for.
4 An economy with hidden e¤ort
In the remainder of this paper, we assume that an agents choice of e¤ort is unobservable.
First, we study an agents e¤ort choice. Next, we characterize the planners allocation.
Finally, we show how the planners allocation can be decentralized.
4.1 E¤ort choice
First, we consider the choice of e¤ort for an agent who takes cm and cn parametrically.
The individual is problem can be written as
max
e
(e)U(cm) + [1  (e)]U(cn) + V (1  e): (15)
Taking the partial derivative of the objective function with respect to e and setting it
to zero yields
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0 (e) [U(cm)  U(cn)]  V 0 (1  e) = 0: (16)
Since V 0(1) = 0, it is apparent from equation (16) that when cn = cm, the optimal
choice of e¤ort is e = 0. That is, an agent who is completely insured against the risk
of relocation exerts no e¤ort to reduce this risk. E¤ort will be positive only if cm < cn.
Intuitively, only if movers receive less consumption than non-movers will agents try to avoid
being relocated.
Since the e¤ort level chosen by an agent depends on cn and cm, we can write e =
e(cm; cn) by invoking the implicit function theorem.
Lemma 1 An agents optimum e¤ort is (i) decreasing in the quantity of consumption good
allocated to movers; and (ii) increasing in the quantity of the consumption good allocated
to non-movers.
Proof. After substituting the e(cm; cn) into the rst-order condition and di¤erentiating,
we get
00[U(cm)  U(cn)]de+ V 00de+ 0U 0dcm = 0:
After collecting terms and rearranging, we can write
de
dcm
=   
0U 0
00[U(cm)  U(cn)] + V 00 :
As usual, the denominator is the second-order condition. If 00 > 0 and V 00 < 0, the sign of
the denominator is negative, ensuring that the second-order condition is satised. In other
words, the value of e that satises the rst-order condition is indeed a maximum.9 With
0 < 0 and positive marginal utility, the implication is that @e@cm < 0. An increase in the
quantity of the consumption given to movers will result in less e¤ort by the consumer. As
9So, 00 > 0 corresponds to a case in which the impact of e¤ort on the probability of moving is getting
algebraically bigger; that is, a smaller negative number.
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movers get more of the consumption, holding everything else constant, there is less need
to use e¤ort to try to indirectly insure themselves against moving. It is straightforward to
show that @e@cn > 0 along the same lines as above.
4.2 The planners problem
The planner chooses how much of the available goods to save and how much to allocate
between movers and nonmovers so as to maximize the expected utility of a representative
generation. Physically, the planner collects endowments from the young on each island.
These goods can be consumed by agents alive in that period or invested in the storage
technology. The planner also collects goods that were invested last period. The planner
is aware of the e¤ect movers have on the return to the technology. Since the planner can
identify movers and non-movers, each type may receive di¤erent quantities of goods.
Recall that the planners problem is
max
cmt ;c
n
t ;st
(et)U(c
m
t ) + [1 (et)]U(cnt ) + V (1  et);
subject to
(et)c
m
t + [1 (et)]cnt = x [1 (et)(1  )] st + !t+1   st+1;
st  !t:
In a steady state, st = st+1 = s  !. The constraints can thus be combined into
(e)cm + [1 (e)]cn = x [1 (e)(1  )]!: (17)
We can substitute the e¤ort function from the previous section, et = e(cmt ; c
n
t ), and take
the partial derivatives with respect to cm and cn to get two rst-order conditions:
em
0[U(cm)  U(cn)  (cm   cn + x(1  )!)]  emV 0 +(e)

U 0(cm)   = 0;
and
en
0[U(cm)  U(cn)  (cm   cn + x(1  )!)]  enV 0 + (1 (e))

U 0(cn)   = 0;
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where  is the Lagrange multiplier on constraint (17) and en  @e(c
m;cn)
@cm and en  @e(c
m;cn)
@cn .
Solve both equations for  to get
em
0[U(cm)  U(cn)]  emV 0 +(e)U 0(cm)
em0[cm   cn + x(1  )!] + (e) = ;
and
en
0[U(cm)  U(cn)]  enV 0 + (1 (e))U 0(cn)
en0[cm   cn + x(1  )!] + (1 (e)) = :
We can eliminate  and obtain one equation in cn and cm. Let 1  em0[U(cm)  
U(cn)]  emV 0 +(e)U 0(cm), 2  em0[cm   cn + x(1  )!] + (e),  1  en0[U(cm) 
U(cn)]  enV 0 + (1 (e))U 0(cn), and  2  en0[cm   cn + x(1  )!] + (1 (e)), then
it is easily checked that 12 =
 1
 2
. The planners resource constraint gives us a second
equation in cn and cm so we can solve for these two unknowns. Let cm and cn denote
the level of consumption chosen by the planner. Next we can solve for the e¤ort level:
e = e(cm; cn).
Proposition 3 The planner gives less consumption to movers than non-movers: cm <
cn.
Proof. Suppose, instead, that the planner chooses cm = cn = c. We can rearrange the
expression 12 =
 1
 2
, to get
[x (1  )!]U 0(c)0 = V 0: (18)
The left hand side of this expression is strictly positive. If cm = cn = c, consumers
exert no e¤ort and V 0(1) = 0, so equation (18) cannot hold. We know from lemma 1 that
some e¤ort will be exerted if cn is increased, cm is decreased, or both.
The intuition is that the planner wants agents to exert some e¤ort to reduce their
chance of relocation. To incentivize agents, he makes relocation a costly activity.
Note that the level of e¤ort desired by the planner is di¤erent when e¤ort is hidden
than when e¤ort is observable; in fact, e < e. When e¤ort is hidden, the planner chooses
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lower e¤ort because the benet from increasing e¤ort must be traded-o¤ with the cost of
distorting consumption. In other words, if the planner were to choose e = e, the cost of
a marginal decrease in e¤ort would be of second order while the benet of improving risk
sharing between movers and nonmovers would be of rst order.
It is clear from our specication of the planners problem that hidden e¤ort and the
cost imposed by movers in terms of lost return to storage are both important features of
the model economy. Together, these features can account for why the planner does not
want to o¤er perfect insurance to agents in this economy. If movers did not impose a cost
on the economy, the planner would not be concerned with reducing the mass of movers. It
would then be optimal to provide equal consumption to all agents since they are risk-averse
and ex-ante identical. Instead, if movers imposed a cost but the probability of moving was
exogenous, then the planner would again choose to provide equal consumption to all agents
since it would not be possible to mitigate the cost imposed by movers.
4.3 The decentralized economy with hidden e¤ort
With hidden e¤ort, the CB can no longer punish agents directly for not choosing the
appropriate level of e¤ort. Agents will now need to be provided the right incentives before
they exert the level of e¤ort chosen by the planner, e:
The representative young agent born at date t solves the following problem:
max
cm;cn;s
 (e (cm; cn))U(cmt ) + (1   (e (cm; cn)))U(cn) + V [1  e (cm; cn)] ; (19)
subject to constraints (11), (12), (13), and (14). Combining the last three equations, we
can write
cm
cn
=
vt+1
vt
1
x [1 (1  )] :
The CB can obtain any ratio cm=cn it desires by choosing vt+1 and vt appropriately.
Clearly, for vt=vt+1 = x [1 (1  )], consumption smoothing arises in the decentralized
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economy. As vt=vt+1 increases, the ratio cm=cn decreases, since the rate of return of money
decreases. Creating a wedge between the returns to the two assets and making relocation
more costly stimulates agents to provide more e¤ort. To replicate the planning solution,
the CB chooses vt=vt+1 in order to set
cm
cn
=
cm
cn
;
which in turn is consistent with agents choosing e¤ort equal to e:
Deviating from the Friedman rule works particularly well in this environment because
only movers use money. However, we can show that our results extend to an environment
where it is di¢ cult to distinguish di¤erent types of agents.
Our model explains why a central bank would want to deviate from the Friedman rule.
In order to implement the e¢ cient allocation, the central bank equates the social cost of
using money with opportunity cost of holding money. In this setup, both are positive.
Thus, we can account for why the overnight rate on borrowing money is positive. Next,
we account for why intraday rates will be zero.
5 Late movers and intraday liquidity
It is well documented that the liquidity provided by central banks overnight is considerably
more costly than the liquidity provided intraday.10 Our model can help shed some light
on this pattern. Indeed, as we argue below, such a pattern may well be part of an optimal
payments system design.
In order to have both intraday and overnight liquidity provision, we need to modify the
pattern of relocations slightly in a manner analogous to Freeman (1996) and Mills (2004,
forthcoming). As before, there is a probability  that a young agent must relocate, and
 is still a function of the agents e¤ort. We call such agents early-movers. Agents who
are not relocated when young may be relocated at the beginning of their second period of
10See Bech and Garratt (2003) and Zhou (2000) for a discussion.
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life with probability . We call such agents late-movers. As above,  is also the fraction
of relocated old agents. For simplicity, we make  exogenous implying that e¤ort has no
e¤ect on .
We assume that late-movers have to leave their island before previously stored goods
in that island pay o¤. This is to motivate a need for money on their part. (Recall that in
any case, goods cannot move across locations.) In contrast to early-movers, however, late-
movers do not a¤ect the return on the storage technology as the benets from their presence
when young have already realized. This distinction between intraday and overnight liq-
uidity is key. It can also be related to the fact that overnight liquidity is used to transfer
resources intertemporally while intraday liquidity is not.
The expected utility of a young agent in this economy can be written as
(e)U(cemt ) + [1  (e)]
h
U(clmt ) + (1  )U(cnt )
i
+ V (1  et); (20)
where cemt is the quantity of the good consumed by the early mover, c
lm
t is the quantity
of the good consumed by a late mover, and cnt is the quantity consumed by a non-mover.
Henceforth, the superscripts em and lm will stand for early and late movers respectively.
5.1 The case of observable e¤ort
When e¤ort is observable, it is straightforward to see that the planner will choose cemt =
clmt = c
n
t . The amount of storage and even the e¤ort are the same as those chosen in section
3.1. With observable e¤ort, the planner does not need to distort the agentsconsumption,
and hence chooses to insure them perfectly against the risk of relocation.
As in section 4.3, we assume that the CB can impose a punishment high enough so
that agents choose e¤ort e. The representative young agent solves
max
cemt ;c
lm
t ;c
n
t ;st
U(cemt ) + (1 )
h
U(clmt ) + (1  )U(cnt )
i
+ V (1  e);
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subject to
st  ! + Tt; (21)
cnt  x [1 (1  )] st; (22)
vt m
em
t  st; (23)
cemt  vt+1 memt ; (24)
vt+1 m
lm
t  x [1 (1  )] st; (25)
clmt  vt+1 mlmt : (26)
All constraints hold with equality. The last two constraints combined, together with con-
straint (22), show that clmt = c
n
t . Then by the same argument as in section 3.2, the CB
can set clmt = c
em
t = c
n
t by choosing
vt+1
vt
= x [1 (1  )] :
The Friedman rule can replicate the planners allocation in this environment. Under the
Friedman rule, the real cost of liquidity to agents is zero, whether money is needed intraday
or overnight.
5.2 The case of hidden e¤ort
From the perspective of the planner, late-movers and non-movers are equivalent. Neither
type has a negative e¤ect on the return to the storage technology and, conditional on not
being an early-mover, the probability of being a non-mover is exogenous. Hence, inspection
of the expected utility function given by expression (20) reveals that the planner will choose
to set clmt = c
n
t . With c
lm
t = c
n
t the planners problem is the same as it was in section 4.
In particular, lemma 1 and proposition 3 both hold.
We can now turn to the problem faced by a CB is a decentralized economy. An repre-
sentative agent chooses cnt ; c
em
t ; c
lm
t ; et, and st to maximize
U(cemt ) + (1  )
h
U(clmt ) + (1  )U(cnt )
i
+ V (1  e);
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subject to constraints (21),(22), (23), (24), (25), and (26).
Proposition 4 The planner gives less consumption to early movers than to late movers
and non-movers: cem < cn = clm.
Proof. Combining equations (25) and (26), at equality, we get clm = x [1 (1  )] st =
cn. With clm = cn, this problem is equivalent to the problem of section 4.3. The CB can
achieve the planners allocation by deviating from the Friedman rule.
In contrast to the previous section, the real cost of liquidity is not the same intraday
and overnight. Intraday, the cost of liquidity is zero since late-movers and non-movers
enjoy the same consumption. The real cost of overnight liquidity is strictly positive since
cemt < c
n
t .
11
Note that the CB could make clm 6= cn. For example, if the price at which goods are
sold is di¤erent from the price at which goods are bought in the same period. But the
CB prefers to set clm = cn. By buying and selling goods at the same price, the CBs
interactions with late-movers resemble a loan at an interest rate of zero.
This model suggests an e¢ ciency reason for why central banks provide intraday and
overnight liquidity at very di¤erent costs. Intraday, the need for liquidity is only related
to making payments and has no e¤ect on aggregate real activity. Its only role is to allo-
cate available resources. In contrast, the cost of overnight liquidity has implications for
aggregate real activity in our model.
From the perspective of young agents, money and storage are two ways of transferring
resources between periods. When money is as good an asset as storage, agents have no
11 It is possible to show that the main insight of this section does not depend on the planner and the CB
being able to perfectly discriminate between early and late movers. In Bhattacharya, Haslag and Martin
(2007), we extend the analysis to consider a case in which movers are indistinguishable. The impact on
the risk-sharing allocation is indeterminate. On the one hand the planner may not want to impose as
much consumption inequality because it hurts late movers. On the other hand, because a given amount
of consumption inequality provides fewer incentives, the planner may want to impose more consumption
inequality. This resembles the standard trade-o¤ between a substitutionand an incomee¤ect.
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incentives to avoid holding money. In our environment, this reduces the return on storage
because there are too many movers. The CB can make money a less attractive asset by
deviating from the Friedman rule. As money becomes a worse alternative to storage, agents
have more incentives to avoid having to hold money. This is benecial as it increases the
return on storage.
Since the planner wants overnight liquidity to be more costly because early movers
reduce the return on storage while late movers do not, one may think that our results
could be overturned by simply assuming that late movers reduce the return on storage
while early movers do not. This is not the case, however, because any agent can pretend
to be early movers while early movers cannot pretend to be late movers. If the CB sets the
cost of overnight liquidity at zero and attempts to set a positive price for intraday liquidity,
all agents have an incentive to pretend to be early movers.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a new explanation for the puzzling di¤erence between the costs of
overnight and intraday liquidity. We argue that the low cost of intraday liquidity is simply
an application of the Friedman rule in an environment where a deviation of the Friedman
rule is optimal with respect to overnight liquidity.
Our model has a number of desirable features: The cost of overnight liquidity can af-
fect output so there is a role for a high cost of overnight liquidity. Agents can choose the
composition of their asset portfolio between money and storage and, if money is too good
an asset,money is overused. Intraday liquidity is not used to transfer goods intertempo-
rally, but only to make payments. With these features, we show that a central bank can
implement a planners allocation by setting a high cost to overnight liquidity and a low
cost to intraday liquidity.
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